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HOMER KRIPKE *
Six months after the Uniform Commercial Code became effective in
Pennsylvania in 1954, the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) met
in New York and had a program on the Code. Although I was not yet then an
academic, I was invited to speak on the occasion because I had participated
actively in the drafting, particularly of Article 9. My principal conclusion at
that time was expressed in two words: "It works." By that I meant that we
had discovered no great bugs in its operations in Pennsylvania during the six
months.
The AALS has now met again with a reflective look at the Code, a few
days after the 27th anniversary of that other meeting. Also, I have recently
passed the first anniversary of my own semi-retirement, and the two occa-
sions have caused me to look back reflectively on the Code. I see three
principal points that are worthy of some comment.
I. IN THE NICK OF TIME
It is curious that the proposed Code was received at best with indiffer-
ence and to some extent with very active and determined opposition by the
great banks and law firms in New York. It might never have succeeded if the
lawyers and bankers from some cities of deeper civilization, Boston and
Philadelphia, had not supported the effort. When one thinks back, it is hard to
understand the shortsighted view of those New Yorkers.
After the war, we quite obviously were posed for a vast expansion of
interstate and international business, new methods and types of financing,
computerization and mechanization. It was completely obvious to many of
us, and should have been obvious to those opponents, that unification of the
law of chattel security and modernization of the law of sales were necessary,
both in terms of their concepts and in terms of eliminating spatial variations in
the law arising from state lines.
It may be that we could have lived with the old Uniform Sales Act and the
old Negotiable Instruments Act. The latter was already reaching the stage of
common law or something like the Statutes of Elizabeth, which were so far in
the past that their text was disregarded. The Uniform Sales Act was rapidly
reaching the same point. We might have been able to live with a continuation
of the common law growth of the law, without the more rapid modernization
and unification that the Code achieved, although the dependence of that old
law on the concept of "title" would have been an increasing handicap.
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But as to chattel security law, the case was different. The common law
courts or individual state legislatures could not in any reasonable period
possibly have reached unification of the forms of security and standardization
of rules that the Code achieved.
When one thinks of our present situation-the vast increase in the
volume and speed of business, of travel and of communication; the mechani-
zation of manufacturing processes; the increased equipment used in service
industries like supermarkets, beauty shops, barber shops, cleaning establish-
ments, hospitals, doctors' and dentists' offices; the vast amounts of new
automated equipment; computerization of accounting and information re-
trieval; the automation of the business office and even of the secretary's desk;
and increasing uses of credit-one can wonder whether we could have held
together and achieved these positions if it had not been for the modernizations
of chattel security of the Code. The Code came just in the nick of time.
II. THE SELECT COMMITTEE PROCESS
But it is not merely the Code as a uniquely successful codification effort
that is worthy of comment. The process by which the Code and many other
highly technical statutes have been drafted in recent years is equally worthy of
notice. We have the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) functioning regularly to codify fields of law for uniform
state adoption; the American Law Institute producing in some situations
model statutes; the American Bar Association drafting and maintaining the
Model Business Corporations Act and now a proposed uniform leasing act;'
and state and local bar associations drafting corporation laws and the like, all
of which are worth noting as a process. Each of these, including those of the
NCCUSL, have as their purpose not merely uniformity but the delegation of
the process of drafting and codifying "lawyers' law" to select groups of
lawyers with specialized knowledge, as distinguished from leaving it to the
generally trained lawyers and non-lawyers of the legislatures, or leaving the
process to the common law. Not only are our laws getting so complex that
they cannot be left for development to the common law adjudicatory process,
whether federal or split among fifty state jurisdictions, but they cannot even
be left to the legislatures, Congress or the fifty state legislatures. Congress
and the state legislatures are living in one of Toynbee's "times of troubles."
2
They are overwhelmed with financial and political questions, and they simply
do not have the time to devote to "lawyers' law." As a minimum, extensive
technical legislation like the U.C.C. has to be drafted by a select group before
it is worked over by the legislature with particular focus on the political and
other public aspects of the situation. This is what happened to the new
Bankruptcy Code,3 which in the first instance was drafted by a specially
I. See Mooney, Personal Property Leasing: A Challenge, 36 BUS. LAW. 1605 (1981).
2. A. J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 12 (Somervell abr. 1947).
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1103 (Supp. IV 1980).
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created commission,4 then worked over for many years by the National
Bankruptcy Conference and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges,
and then its policy aspects debated (rather effectively, on the whole) by
Congress.
Every effort must be made to encourage this kind of lawmaking in
complex legal fields.
But more is needed. Business and financial practice will not accom-
modate us by standing still, and these codified systems of law are not com-
pleted for all eternity, but must move with practice. In the case of the Code
itself, I believe, we had something less that a full realization of this point.
Some of Karl Llewellyn's greatest admirers, who were the most enthusiastic
in viewing the Code as his monument, were reluctant to countenance any
changes for fear that removal or change of any of the bricks would undermine
the edifice. I believe that this attitude in part slowed down the drafting and
adoption of the 1972 amendments. This attitude is a mistake. Just as we could
not depend on judicial development to bring the law up to date in 1952, so we
could not do so in 1972, and it took the same kind of a select committee
process to keep the statute up to date. Llewellyn's great monument must be
viewed as an evolving corpus of law, not as a rigid, unchanging edifice, or it
will not long survive the changes that once again may be impending. Karl
would have been the first to say so.
We already have a revised Article 8, ready to go when circumstances
again seem to make necessary the certificateless share of stock. We already
have the elimination of paper shares of stock on periodic issuance by invest-
ment companies and under dividend reinvestment plans, and we have similar
book entry without pieces of paper in the case of United States notes and
bills. Articles 3 and 4 are in process of being rewritten to effectuate the
checkless, paperless society of the electronic fund transfer. Article 6 is in the
process of revision by an American Bar Association committee that will
tender its completed draft to the Permanent Editorial Board for the Code.
Another ABA committee is considering whether it will propose a uniform
statute on leases, and if so, whether it will propose it as a new article of the
Code.
The public notice provisions of Article 9 may also be in need of rethink-
ing. Over fifty years ago John Hanna challenged Karl Llewellyn's then pend-
ing efforts in connection with his drafts of predecessor statutes to the Code to
adopt widespread public filing requirements.7 On the other hand, Peter
Coogan has recently challenged the Code's reliance on possession as an alter-
4. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H. R. DOC.
NO. 137, (Parts I and II), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
5. See e.g., BANKRUPTCY LAW REVIEW, H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (accompany-
ing H.R. 8200).
6. I have expanded on this point in Kripke, Mr. Levenberg's Criticism of the Final Report of the Article 9
Review Committee: A Reply, 56 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1972).
7. Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 617 (1931).
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native to public filing." But these points of view do not collectively leave us
with validation without public notice as the only permissible posture. Both
authors agree on the fact that in the modem world public notice of the exist-
ence of encumbrances on assets realistically occurs through financial state-
ments and reporting to and by credit agencies. But no one has carefully
thought through the question how disclosure to such agencies would have to
be regulated to use it as a proper vehicle for public notice.
Coogan also hints that we need to do some basic thinking: The floating
lien floats over such broad categories and such rapidly changing collateral that
it is more a priority than a lien under older conceptions. Why should the law
permit a creditor to obtain an advantage by contracting for a floating lien
when he could not validly contract for a priority distribution in insolvency?
Some fundamental rethinking may be in order here. 9
Article 2 on Sales has never been worked over since the inception of the
Code. It is sufficiently general in its drafting (and, as some would contend,
with sufficiently opposed rules embodied in its drafting) that courts are largely
free to develop the law by a common law type of development.'0 But Article 2
seems to be creaking in several areas: finding a modem scope for the law of
warranty in the light of developments in strict liability in tort;" the limitation
of remedies; damage questions; impossibility and frustration questions; pro-
tection of enabling buyers; 2 definition of the scope and operation of the "lost
profit" concept of section 2-708(2); 13 harmonization of the provisions govern-
ing seller's resale of goods under sections 2-706 and 2-708 with those govern-
ing resale by a seller or other secured party in section 9-504, and other lack of
harmonization of Articles 2 and 9;14 and perhaps other situations.
Without prejudging any of these possible developments, it is important
for lawyers to realize that occasions for the appointment of select committees
will constantly arise, and that we must find new and better processes to
ensure that the law stays uniform by the uniform and rapid adoption of up-
dating amendments. Otherwise, whenever any of these problems arise, there
will always be the suggestion that the laborious process of uniform state
amendment be cut short by federal preemption of the field of law.
8. Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012 (1978).
9. Professor Grant Gilmore has recently attacked the scope ofthe floating lien from another point ofview.
See note 23 infra.
10. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199 (1963).
11. Rabin and Grossman, Defective Products or Realty Causing Economic Loss: Toward a Unified Theory
of Recovery, 12 Sw. L.J. 4 (1981).
12. Skilton, Buyer in Ordinary Course of Business Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (and
Related Matters), 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1, 21-24 (1974); Jackson and Kronman, A Pleafor the Financing Buyer, 85
YALE L.J. I (1975).
13. See Childres and Burgess, Seller's Remedies: The Primacy of UCC 2-708(2), 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 833
(1973). Compare Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of UCC Section 2-708(2) (One Profit for the Reseller),
24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 697 (1973).
14. See Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a
Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 619, 628 (1981); Jackson and Peters, Quest for Uncertainty: A
Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907 (1978).
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III. THE ISSUE UNDERLYING THE TENSION BETWEEN ARTICLE 9
AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
Grant Gilmore, with whose name Article 9 will forever be associated, has
recently described in interesting fashion how at the beginning of his steward-
ship of the drafting process, some practicing specialists in the field, including
the present author, appeared and volunteered their help. 5 Grant's cheerful
acceptance of this aid was not emulated at first by others among the academic
drafting group, and I recall that when I wanted to get on the first committee of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York concerned with the Code,
the chairman said that he had been warned by Miss Mentschikoff not to let the
finance companies capture the committee. Although Soia Mentschikoff has
since denied the statement attributed to her, there is no doubt in my recollec-
tion that the statement was attributed to her. Later, the drafting staff came to
have a realization not only that lender credit is important to the economy and
particularly to small business, but that asset-based financing of the kind prac-
ticed in those days by the finance companies is particularly important to
smaller business, which cannot tap either the institutional private placement
market or the public securities markets. Soia Mentschikoff, in particular,
must have had a change of heart, because she prepared a brief for the
Permanent Editorial Board in the leading case, Adams v. Southern California
First National Bank, ' 6 arguing that peaceful repossession under section 9-504
is not an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process, and in
the "Brandeis" part of the brief she cited figures showing that financial lender
credit provides more funds to small business than does vendor credit.
After an academic discussion whether secured credit should be abolished
altogether, Article 9 went to the other pole and ended up facilitating secured
financing by notice filing, validation of the after-acquired property clauses
and future advance clauses, and abolition of the "dominion" rule.' 7 These
points are at the heart of the "floating lien." Others contended that many of
these provisions would be knocked out by the Bankruptcy Act.'8 While the
current of decisions under the old Bankruptcy Act was to the contrary,' 9
these contenders seem to have won before the Congress what they lost in the
state legislatures and the courts. The new Bankruptcy Code provides substan-
tial encroachment on the position of secured credit by its automatic stay of the
secured party's rights to enforce his collateral on default, 20 and by authorizing
15. Gilmore, Remarks, in Dedication to Professor Homer Kripke, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1981).
16. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
17. U.C.C. § 9-205 (1977) (overruling Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925)).
18. Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Sug-
gested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 518 (1960); Kennedy, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial
Code on Insolvency: Article 9, 67 COM. L.J. 113 (1962); Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75
COM. L.J. 269 (1970).
19. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969); Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank &
Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 827 (1969); In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir.
1971).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. IV 1980).
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the debtor's use of the collateral, including even cash collateral. 2, How far the
provisions of the statute for protection of the secured party will indeed pro-
vide protection remains to be seen, and the issue presents one of the most
important questions as to the workability of the new Bankruptcy Code. 22 It
would indeed be a travesty if the single most important part of the Uniform
Commercial Code's achievement in facilitating invigoration of the economy
by financing small business were to be nullified through the provisions of the
Bankruptcy CodeY
I believe that this approach in the Bankruptcy Code is founded on an
obsolete assumption that secured creditors are anxious to foreclose and take
advantage of desperate but viable, well-intentioned debtors, and to the dis-
advantage of the unsecured creditor body who are largely trade creditors.
Whatever truth there may have been in this assumption at some time, there
remains little validity to it at the present time. Most of the finance companies
have been taken over by banks, particularly large banks. Much of the com-
mercial receivables business is now in the hands of bankers. No one who does
asset-based financing wants to have to prove his skill as a liquidator by taking
over the collateral and liquidating it successfully. He would far rather keep
the debtor going if possible. His errors are far more likely to be those of undue
indulgence of delinquency than they are of cutthroat enforcement of rights at
the first sign of default. As for the unsecured creditors, they will be far more
likely to salvage something if the secured creditor is encouraged to play along
with the debtor and try to rehabilitate him, or to close him down promptly
before additional losses when he cannot do so, than they will by our giving the
debtor too much power to hold creditors, both secured and unsecured, at bay
in the bankrupcy court. The great risk in this situation to both unsecured and
21. I1 U.S.C. §§ 363, 364(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
22. See, e.g., I1 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d), 363(c)(2)-(4) (Supp. IV 1980). On the adequacy of this scheme to
protect secured party rights, see Reisman and Mooney, Drafting and Negotiating the Equipment Lease, in
EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 1, 123-86 (B. -Fritch and A. Reisman eds. 2d ed. 1980);
Reisman, The Challenge of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act to Accounts Receivable and Inventory Financing of
Small- to Medium-Sized Business (pts. 1 and 2), 83 COM. L.J. 169, 211 (1978).
23. Professor Grant Gilmore, for whom my admiration is unlimited, has recently astounded his old com-
rades among the Code draftsmen by repudiating many of the conclusions of his splendid article, The Commercial
Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954). Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the
Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605 (1981). See also
Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441 (1979). I do not go
along, in general, with his changed viewpoint, still less with several of his positions attacking doctrines that he
associates with the floating lien, and therefore not at all with his positions supporting the weakening of the
creditor's security under the Bankruptcy Code. While I understand Coogan's policy concern, see text accom-
panying notes 7-8 supra, I do not understand what led Gilmore to his current view. Unfortunately, expression of
my views will have to await another day, for the editor's deadline came upon me just as Gilmore's recent articles
came to my attention.
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secured creditors lies in the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that permit
the use of the new Chapter 11 as a device by which a debtor may hold off his
creditors while he continues to lose money, pay himself or his principals
continued salaries, and perhaps continue to bleed the business, before they
can persuade a complaisant bankruptcy judge that the situation is hopeless
and before further losses to all creditors and further deterioration are
permitted.
Views will differ, of course, on this expression, but it remains one of the
vital problems in today's relationship of the Uniform Commercial Code and
the Bankruptcy Code.

